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the manner in which Israel played an active role in the Middle Eastern arena. Throughout the analysis, the Israeli government is conceptualized as a political broker acting to construct "national interests" and "ethnic categories" in order to fulfil its own objectives (raison d'etat). State political actors formed a common Zionist identity for Jews of very different backgrounds, and simultaneously formed common oppositional identity for all "Arabs." The paper demonstrates that by symbolizing the property of each group as collective rather than individual, the state helped construct these national identity categories as antagonistic.
Structurally, the article begins with a contextual background that sets forth the major parameters within which the drama described by the empirical material took place. This is followed by an analysis of the emigration of Iraq's Jews in the context of the ongoing theoretical debate over the question of nationalism. Finally, I will present an empirical description of actions taken by the government of Israel vis-a-vis the Jewish property and the Palestinian property in question. There was no local Zionist movement in Iraq to serve as a foundation on which the emissaries could build.19 The Jews of Iraq had not experienced a Zionist "awakening" and did not consider Palestine an attractive option. In 1941, Eliahu Epstein (Elath), from the Jewish Agency's Political Department, had already met with a group of affluent Iraqi Jews who had fled to Tehran. However, he was unable to convince them to settle in Palestine and invest their capital there. Some of them told him bluntly that they did not believe in Zionism.20 They explained that they had no intention of displacing In March 1950, Iraq enacted a denaturalization law-valid for one year-that enabled the Jews to leave the country after renouncing their citizenship. All told, more than 100,000 Jews were brought to Israel from Iraq in the period between May 1950 and June 1951, all of them by air.32 Some 60,000 of them were brought to Israel in the last three months of the operation, between March and June 1951, but only after their property had been impounded by the Iraqi government. Thus was an entire community, strongly attached to its native land, uprooted, and its right-and the right of individuals within it-to decide its own fate appropriated.33 Moreover, the community was deprived of its economic rights and of the right to decide where to live and what nation to be a part of. More acutely, perhaps, the collective memory of a community was appropriated and transplanted into a different narrative-the Zionist narrativewhich the Iraqi Jews had no share in creating. As the Zionist narrative tells it, Iraq's Jews were a community under virtual siege, and their transfer to Israel was a "rescue aliya." That narrative posits a natural, harmonious connection between (Jewish) "ethnicity" and (Zionist) "nationalism." I turn now to a brief theoretical discussion of the connection between these two categories, in which I will argue that the case of Iraq's Jews illuminates the problematic nature of the primordial approach of nationalism as it is depicted both in academic research and in Zionist historiography.
THE JEWS OF IRAQ IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEBATE ON

NATIONALISM
For some years, a fascinating debate has been conducted in the literature over the question of modern nationalism. One approach holds that the sources of nationalism are primordial.34 Nationalism, the proponents of this view argue, is a result of a natural, sui generis process of coalescence involving collective loyalties and identities, which has always characterized human communities.35 "Ethnic" identity is said to have undergone a modern reworking into national ideology. This approach finds a direct, and one-directional, relationship between ethnicity and nationalism: the renewal of ethnie, the desire of the group's members to return to the "ethnic" homeland. In Smith's conception, Zionism was a form of "diaspora nationalism" which renewed its ethnie in the common territory of the Holy Land. Jews have survived as an ethnic group since the time of Ezra, saw themselves as belonging to the sacred soil, and have always invoked ancient symbols, such as the Torah scrolls, the menorah, fasting, and the rituals of kosher food as unifying collective emblems. Gellner dubs this model the "Sleeping Beauty syndrome," referring to the revival of a latent, dormant, primeval force.36 Other scholars, however, maintain that nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon, a functional substitute for pre-modern categories, and a mechanism of mobilization in the hands of political elites.37 Eric Hobsbawm, for example, refuses to see a connection with the past as being relevant to modern nationalism. Thus, the bringing of Jews to Palestine has no connection with an ancient yearning for Zion among Jewish communities in the various diaspora communities. Jews, rather, came to Palestine due to the activity of Zionist functionaries and intellectuals who engaged in the "engineering of nationalism" and also "invented" the tradition of the past by overlaying it in national colors. The national symbolism of Zionism, including the appropriation of the past to serve its purposes, was forged by modem intellectuals such as Max Nordau and Ben-Zion Dinur.38 History and mythology, this conception holds, are organized and tailored to meet present needs.39 As Uri Ram put it succinctly, "The 'national past' is an image that is forged in the present, and the 'national present' is an image that rests The description here of the means by which Iraq's Jews were brought to Israel shows clearly that it is essential to distinguish between Jewishness as an ethno-linguistic category and Zionist nationalism as propounded by European Jewish intellectuals from the end of the 19th century. Zionism, it should be borne in mind, was meant as a response to the distinctive conditions and problems of Eastern European Jews, not to the situation of the Jews in the Arab lands. The Zionist elite was always European, and its idiosyncratic outlook subsequently gave rise to the Jewish national ideology in Palestine. The Jewish community of Iraq preserved all the ethnic symbols across generations of existential continuity. Indeed, the Jews in Iraq expressed a primeval, albeit abstract, yearning for Zion, but they were as remote from political Zionism as east is from west. The majority refused to view themselves as Zionists and opposed the Zionist movement, which began to penetrate Iraq beginning in the 1930s for its own social, economic, and political purposes. I believe that the empirical description that follows should be seen as the concrete manifestation of the heavy price paid by an ethnic community that moved/was moved from an "ethnic" state of being to a "national" state of being.
The primordial version mobilizes the ethnic in order to create the "national." In the case of the Iraqi Jews, the encounter of the ethnic with European Zionist nationalism illustrates the tension as well as the contradiction between these social categories. It proves that different ethnic groups are not homogeneous, and that a monolithic perception of their national affiliation is misplaced. The nationality of Iraq's Jews was "forged" in the press of the Zionist enterprise together with the appropriation of the community's place, territory, and yearnings. The contradiction between the "ethnic" and the "national" in the creation of a "nation-state," and the question of who gains and who loses in that process, is at the center of our discussion.
The analysis that follows is based on documents that were found in the State Archive and in the Zionist Archive. I will begin by recounting the discussions held by the Israeli government about bringing Iraq's Jews to Israel; I will then go on to describe how the government maneuvered the question of the Jewish and Palestinian property. The attitudes and desires of the Israeli government with regard to both sets of property will dramatize more strikingly the gap between the primordial version of "diaspora nationalism" and the historical reality-in other words, the long road and the heavy price entailed in the transition of Iraq's Jews from ethnicity to nationalism. I hope to demonstrate that government action regarding property matters had tremendous ramifications in terms of identity construction. By defining Iraqi Jews as Israeli citizens, the Israeli government was able to deny Palestinian rights for reparations, and at a later stage denied the Palestinian rights to return to Palestine. Sharett's concern was over a possible future claim of compensation by Iraq's Jews should the Israeli government agree to a transfer deal. The possibility of extricating the Iraqi Jews together with their property was lost in the accounting logic that he developed: "This would be a dangerous precedent vis-a-vis other countries. We will be confronted by tens of thousands of people who will arrive, naked and destitute, demanding that we give them property. This could entangle us in an extricable impasse."
DISCUSSIONS
The transfer idea, it should be noted, was not alien to Zionist thinking; it was manifested in both praxis and ideology before and after the Iraqi Jews were brought to Israel.63 The Israeli government's disregard of the transfer offers was thus motivated by instrumental rather than moral considerations. The government believed that by officially agreeing to a transfer-despite the opportunity it presented to bring the Jews of Iraq to Israel-it would create a "dangerous" precedent. There is tremendous excitement within the Baghdad community [in Israel]. I will probably receive a delegation from them today. They will undoubtedly advise that we confiscate the property of all the Arabs in Israel and that we give these people the property of the Arabs which is in the possession of the state. I do not have to explain to you-you understand the problem this gives rise to.
Neither Sharett nor Ben-Gurion viewed this as a realistic option. In its place a logic of accounting was formulated by Sharett:
There is another possibility: a declaration on our part that all this will be taken into account in the payment of compensation in a final settlement, etc. Let us say that if for the time being we have not abandoned the principle of payment of compensation, we declare that we will deduct the value of this property .... With this decision-which in one fell swoop turned the private capital of Iraq's Jews into "national capital"-the Israeli government nullified any possible alternative for their independent compensation.86 The Foreign Ministry informed the Palestine Conciliation Commission that the government of Israel was committed to contributing toward a resolution of the refugee problem, but added: "It will be unable to honor that commitment if in addition to its other commitments to absorb new immigrants it will find itself having to undertake the rehabilitation of 100,000 Iraqi Jews."87 In the debate that followed Sharett's statement to the Knesset, the Iraqi government's moves drew wall-to-wall condemnation. Tawfiq Toubi of the Communist Party termed the property freeze "reactionary," "racist," and "fascist." Some speakers drew an analogy with the "Nazi plunder." Meir Argov (Mapai) noted that the Israeli government had intended to help resolve the refugee problem, "but now, after the plunder of the Iraqi Jews, we will be exempt from that obligation." Although Baghdad was universally criticized, only three Knesset members had harsh words for the Israeli government. Eliahu Eliachar (Sephardi List) questioned the government's slow pace in bringing the Iraqi Jews to Israel. Castigating the "quota" system, he revealed that Sharett had rejected a request he had made together with Behor Shitrit to speed up the rate of emigration. Right-wing Knesset members directly assailed the absurd logic and terminology of the accounting approach. Israel Rokach (General Zionists) stated, "We cannot accept... that it is possible to immediately open a system of accounting and thereby 'cover up' the plunder and taking of property.... It is inconceivable ... that we should make do with entering from the other side of the ledger a debit against the robbery." Also protesting Sharett's use of the term "account" was Ya'akov Meridor (Herut). He insisted that the Arab states owed Israel compensation of "hundreds of millions of pounds sterling," and not the reverse. Consequently, there was nothing to be gained by threatening to deduct the value of the Jewish assets in Iraq "from a sum which we are under no obligation whatsoever to pay."88 Sharett's statement, which linked the frozen Jewish assets in Iraq with the Palestinians' property and seemed to hold out the promise of compensation for the Iraqi Jews, was aimed at both the Iraqi Jews and the international community. It was necessary to send a message to the Iraqi Jews, as they had assailed the Zionist activists for doing nothing to salvage the community's property. The statement-whose implications Sharett would later disavow-had the intended effect of assuaging the concern of the Iraqi Jews, but also of generating high expectations among them. They were now convinced that they would receive restitution from the Israeli government for the property they were leaving behind. According to a cable from the Zionist emissaries in Iraq, The Israeli government's creation of the linked property account was a singular act-something of a historic milepost-that constructed a zero-sum equation between the Jews of the Arab countries and the Palestinians in Israel. The political theory that underlay the Israeli government's construction of that equation rested on a system of moral, diplomatic, and economic assumptions that resulted in a practice of nationalization and naturalization that was riddled with contradictions. The government of Israel automatically assumed that the Jewish ethnicity of the Iraqi Jews meant that they harbored a Zionist orientation. It "endowed" them de facto with that particular form of national identity before they had any intention of immigrating to Israel and certainly without having obtained their consent. The Foreign Ministry was aware that the Iraqi Jews could not be considered refugees, still less citizens of Israel.100 The process of nationalizing and naturalizing the Iraqi Jews-while they were still in Iraq-was collective rather than individual. The parties in question were not consulted. As Sharett put it, "I said that we will not rely on the free choice of the refugees, but that this is a question of an agreement between states."101 On the basis of this naturalization, the Israeli government "appropriated" the property of all of Iraq's Jews in order to use itrhetorically, symbolically, and judicially-as state property in every respect. In the sociology of national movements, this model is called, following Anthony Smith, "diaspora nationalism." It holds world Jewry to be a dispersed ethnic community aspiring to return to territory which it claims is its national home."'10 Yaron Tzur, in his discussion of Zionism as "diaspora nationalism" or a "nationalism of dispersions," maintains that this form of nationalism generates more acute internal conflicts and rifts than is the case among national movements that are based on a territorial model. That conclusion is undoubtedly correct, but we have to take a step back and argue that it is incorrect to assume a priori that all diaspora communities with the same ethnic origin share their nationalist feelings equally, if at all. Indeed, we can definitely assume (if only as a working hypothesis) that political elites make use of nationalism as constituting rhetoric and practice which nullify the will and the status of peripheral ethnic communities.111 In the case of the Mizrahi Jews, such communities may confer on nationalism a different interpretation from the one preferred by the Ashkenazi hegemony.
[Finance Minister] Eliezer
The concept of "diaspora nationalism" locates the Jewish ethno-linguistic community within the Zionist narrative, in which it is assumed that the place of every Jewish community is in Israel. This is a retrospective conclusion. It presupposes that the outcome of the Zionist project in the 20th century is the only possible and desirable historical alternative, and it does not allow the independent existence of a counterfactual option.
However, the present case shows that the transition from ethnicity to nationalism is not self-evident, is not linear, and does not fit Smith's "diaspora nationalism" concept. 
